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IN THE 
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vs. 
Timothy Craig Godfrey, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a felony conviction for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly refused to hold a Franks evidentiary 
hearing where Defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the 
search warrant affidavit contained intentional or reckless misstatements and 
omissions material to the determination of probable cause? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal 
standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 P.3d 699. The court's 
underlying factual findings, including an officer's credibility, are reviewed for clear 
error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, % 11,100 P.3d 1222. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss in 
the absence of any showing that the requested discovery existed, was potentially 
exculpatory, or was material to the defense? 
Standard of Review. "Whether the State's destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law that [the appellate 
court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,112,162 P.3d 1106. 
"'However, because this question requires application of facts in the record to the 
due process standard, [the appellate court] incorporate[s] a clearly erroneous 
standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations.'" Id. (quoting Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, t 25,100 P.3d 1177). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULE 
The following constitutional provisions and rule are attached at Addendum 
A: 
U. S. Const., amend. IV; 
Utah Const., art I, § 7; and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
During the execution of a search warrant at Defendant's residence, the police 
found various controlled substances and paraphernalia. R2-3. Defendant was 
charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(psilocybin mushrooms - Count I and Marijuana - Count 2) and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 3). Rl-2. After waiving a preliminary 
hearing, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his home. R24,29-30. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R46-47. 
Subsequently, Defendant obtained new counsel and again moved to suppress. 
Defendant requested and evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 155 (1978), alleging that the affidavit supporting the search warrant contained 
numerous material misstatements, misrepresentations, and omissions which, when 
removed, nullified probable cause to issue the warrant. R89-97; see Affidavit for 
Search Warrant (" Affidavit"), R42-44 (Addendum B). Shortly thereafter, Defendant 
moved to dismiss the information, alleging that the State had failed to produce a 
police report that purportedly would have exposed the "Franks" deficiencies in the 
affidavit. R100-09. 
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The trial court heard both of Defendant's motions at the same hearing and 
later denied both motions. See Ruling and Order ("Ruling"), R136-39 (Addendum 
C); R275 (hearing of November 29, 2007):2-29. 
Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(psilocybin mushrooms), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2008), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
motions to suppress and to dismiss. R245,247-48. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the 
two remaining charges were dismissed. R245. The court sentenced Defendant to a 
statutory zero-to-five-year term in the Utah State Prison, but suspended the prison 
term and placed Defendant on probation for twenty-four months. R260-61. Based 
on the State's stipulation, the court stayed the sentence pending the outcome of 
Defendant's appeal. R268. 
Defendant timely appealed. R266. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 24, 2005, Detective Ivan Briggs of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department swore out an affidavit for a search warrant. See Affidavit for Search 
Warrant ("Affidavit"), R42-44. The affidavit stated the following facts: Salt Lake 
City Police officers conducted a controlled purchase of methamphetamine. R43. 
After the controlled purchase, the suspects were followed to 4521 South Julep Drive. 
4 
Id. The suspects were driving a white Pontiac Grand Am bearing Utah license plate 
634VJV. Id. The Grand Am pulled into the garage of the listed residence and the 
driver entered the residence by the front door. 
The affidavit continued: In the early morning hours of May 23,2005, narcotics 
detectives conducted a trash cover at the single-family residence. Id. The detectives 
located a garbage can at the curb directly in front of the residence. Id. The 
detectives removed numerous sacks of garbage from the can. Id. The sacks were 
taken to a secure location and searched. Id. Inside one of the sacks, detectives found 
numerous residency documents for a "Mr. Godfrey/' with the address of 4521 South 
Julep Drive. Id. Within the same sack they also found a marijuana stem. Id. 
Detective Briggs field tested the stem, which tested positive for marijuana. Id. 
On May 24, 2005, Detective Briggs obtained a warrant to search the 4521 
South Julep Drive residence for marijuana, material related to its possession or 
distribution, and associated drug paraphernalia for smoking marijuana. Id. at 42. 
The warrant was executed at Defendant's residence, 4521 South Julep Drive, 
the same day. R2. There, the police found 2.7 grams of marijuana, a glass pipe, a 
wooden pipe, and rolling papers. Id. at 2-3. They also found 3.0 grams of 
mushrooms, which the Utah State Crime Laboratory identified as psilocin. Id. at 2. 
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Defendant admitted that all of the controlled substances and paraphernalia 
belonged to him. Id. at 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Defendant was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 US. 154 (1978). 
Defendant claims that the affidavit for a warrant to search his residence 
contains numerous intentional or recklessly made misrepresentations, 
misstatements, and omissions designed to mislead the magistrate into finding 
probable cause to issue the warrant. The allegations of misstatement generally stem 
from Defendant's misperception that the affidavit sought to tie him to the controlled 
methamphetamine buy, and that the controlled methamphetamine buy was related 
to the search of his residence. In that vein, he focuses on the absence of detail about 
the controlled methamphetamine buy and the absence of information about 
procedures the police might have used to identify the suspect in the controlled buy, 
which he claims might have exculpated him. Defendant, however, offers no proof 
on the substance of the alleged misstatements, nor does he make any showing 
whatsoever that even if statements in the affidavit were false, that they were made 
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deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. The trial court correctly 
recognized that Defendant's allegations were speculative. 
The court also correctly determined that none of the alleged misstatements 
were material to the probable cause determination. The police followed a car from 
the controlled methamphetamine buy to a residence, later identified as Defendant's. 
They then conducted a trash cover and discovered a marijuana stem, along with 
documents bearing the name "Mr. Godfrey" and the address of the targeted 
residence in a single garbage sack. On these facts, the court correctly determined 
that even if any alleged misstatement concerning the controlled buy were redacted 
from the affidavit, the trash discovery alone provided probable cause to justify the 
issuance of the warrant to search the premises. 
H. 
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of the information on a claim that 
the State had lost or destroyed an allegedly existent report pertaining to the 
controlled methamphetamine buy. Analysis of the question is based on rule 16 — 
whether the allegedly lost or destroyed evidence is potentially exculpatory — and the 
factors set out in State v. Wiedemann, 2007 UT 49,162 P.2d 1106 —the reason for the 
destruction or loss, including the degree of the State's negligence, and the degree of 
prejudice to the defendant. 
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Based on those factors, the trial court correctly determined that dismissal was 
unjustified. The court found and the record supports that the alleged report 
concerning the controlled methamphetamine buy did not exist. Rather, information 
concerning such buys was recorded in a "buy book/' a compilation of notes to 
establish probable cause in the event charges were ever filed. In this case, however, 
Defendant was not charged with the controlled buy and, therefore, no report was 
made. Accordingly, Defendant failed to establish that the sought-after report 
existed. Further, Defendant has failed to show that any report concerning the 
uncharged controlled methamphetamine buy would have been relevant to his 
defense in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO HOLD A 
FRANKS EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL PRELIMINARY 
SHOWING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT 
CONTAINED INTENTIONAL OR RECKLESS 
MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS MATERIAL TO THE 
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
'The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection . . . is the Warrant Clause, 
requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and 
disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search/7 Franks v. Delaware, 438 
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U.S. 154,164 (1978). To obtain a warrant, an officer must submit an affidavit that 
"set[s] forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of probable 
cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an independent evaluation of the 
matter/' Id. at 165. In reviewing the affidavit, the magistrate makes a "'practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair 
probability that the contraband will be found in the place described/" State v. 
Saddler, 2004 UT105, % 11,104 P.3d 1265 (quoting State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,130 
(Utah 1987)). 
The ability of the magistrate to conduct an independent reviews is, of course, 
dependent on the good faith of the officer seeking the warrant. In other words, the 
value of the warrant protection can only be realized if the officer submitting the 
warrant affidavit makes a "truthful showing" of evidence supporting probable 
cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65 (quotation and citation omitted). "This does not 
mean 'truthful' in the sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is 
necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon information received 
from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant's own knowledge 
that sometimes must be garnered hastily." Id. at 165. Rather, truthful means that 
the information in the affidavit "is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant 
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as true." Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that the information 
contained in a warrant affidavit carries a "presumption of validity/' Id. at 171. 
A. Evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant may be suppressed only 
if the affiant deliberately or recklessly misrepresented or omitted 
facts and the misrepresentation or omission was material to the 
probable cause finding. 
In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that where a warrant affidavit 
includes "allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth/' 
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed if the allegedly 
false statements are material to the probable cause finding. Id. at 171-72. In State v. 
Nielsen, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[b]y extension of reasoning, the same 
test applies when a misstatement occurs because information is omitted." State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,191 (Utah 1986); accord United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 
1297 (10th Cir. 2000). 
Under Franks and Nielsen, a challenge to a warrant based on an allegedly 
misleading affidavit ('Franks motion") involves a two-step process. First, the 
defendant must demonstrate that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing by (a) 
making a "substantial preliminary showing" that the affiant intentionally or 
recklessly misled the magistrate in the affidavit, and (b) demonstrating that the 
alleged misrepresentation was "necessary to the finding of probable cause/' Franks, 
10 
438 U.S. at 155-56,171. If the defendant makes that showing, he proceeds to step 
two —an evidentiary hearing. There, the defendant must prove, "by a 
preponderance of the evidence/' that the affidavit was misleading, whether by 
inclusion or omission, and that the affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the 
magistrate. Id. at 156. If the defendant meets his evidentiary burden, "and . . . the 
affidavit's [modified] content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search 
warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if 
probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit/7 Id. Accord, Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
at 191. 
Under step one, the defendant must "point out specifically the portion of the 
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false," or otherwise misleading, and 
affirmatively allege that the affiant misled the magistrate " deliberate[ly] . . . or 
[with] reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 171. The alleged misrepresentation 
may not be speculative or conclusory, but must be "accompanied by an offer of 
proof" and supported by "[affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of 
witnesses . . ., or their absence satisfactorily explained." Id. In addition, the 
defendant must give "supporting reasons" for suppression, i.e., he must 
demonstrate that when the "alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side," 
Franks at 171-72, or "the omitted information is inserted," Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191, 
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the modified affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Franks, 
438 U.S. at 171-72; Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. Absent this additional showing, an 
evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See United States v. Souffivnt, 338 F.3d 809,822 
(7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Martin, 332 F.3d 827, 834 (5th Cir. .2003); McKissick, 
204 F.3d at 1297; United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030,1041 (11th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36,47 (1st Cir. 1990).1 
B. The trial court correctly determined that defendant was not 
entitled to a Franks evidentiary hearing because he was unable to 
show that the affidavit intentionally or recklessly contained 
material misstatements or omissions or that any of the purported 
misstatements or omissions were material to the determination of 
probable cause. 
Defendant claims that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained 
numerous "misrepresentations/ omissions/misstatements" which, when removed, 
nullified probable cause to issue the warrant. Aplt. Br. at 12-15. Therefore, he 
argues, the trial court incorrectly denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing 
under Franks. Id. at 15. 
The trial court properly rejected Defendant's claims. Identifying the required 
showings for an evidentiary hearing under Franks, the court first observed that 
1
 This requirement promotes judicial economy by allowing an evidentiary 
hearing only if the defendant demonstrates that he or she is likely to prevail if the 
alleged misrepresentations prove true. 
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under Franks " [a] defendant is not allowed a hearing based on mere conjecture." See 
Ruling, R136-139, at 136 (Addendum C). The court then noted that "many of the 
alleged 'omissions' don't qualify for Franks scrutiny" because they "do not create 
misstatements." Id. at 137. Rather, "the Defendant's arguments go to whether the 
magistrate had probable cause to issue a warrant with the information given." Id. 
"For example," the court wrote, "the Defendant argues that the affidavit omits any 
discussion of whether the officer(s) did a check on the license plate or attempted to 
connect it to the residence. Lack of evidence on this point doesn't seem to create a 
'misstatement' in the warrant." Id. The court further found that "for those 
statements, etc. that could be material, the defendant does not provide 'an offer of 
proof of 'deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth/" Id. (quoting 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). 
The trial court's generalized observations accurately capture the deficiencies 
in each of the alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and misstatements claimed. 
1. Statement of the license plate number and driver's entry into 
the house. 
The affidavit states that after a controlled methamphetamine buy, the police 
followed the suspects, who were driving a white Pontiac Grand Am, license plate 
number 634 VJV, to 4521 South Julep Drive, and that upon arrival at that address, 
13 
the car pulled into the garage and the driver entered the front door of the house. 
R43. Defendant asserts that these affidavit statements are misrepresentations which 
show "at least . . . reckless disregard for the truth" because they misleadingly imply 
that it was Defendant's Grand Am that had been at the controlled buy, which 
Defendant claims cannot be true because his white Grand Am bears license plate 
number 607 VGV. Aplt. Br. at 13. 
Though Defendant suggest the police confused the car involved in the 
controlled buy with his, he offered no proof that the police did not in good faith 
follow a white Grand Am with license plate 634 VJV to his residence or that the 
driver of that car did not enter the residence after arrival. Instead, as the trial court 
found, the allegation that the police confused two similar colored cars, with similar 
license plates, at worst, establishes an innocent mistake.2 This is especially true 
2
 This record contains no evidence that Defendant, in fact, owns a white 
Pontiac Grand Am bearing license plate 607 VGV, other than Defendant's own 
assertion below. R91. Accordingly, the Court may properly assume that 
Defendant's claim of ownership of a different Grand Am than that followed by the 
detectives is without foundation. See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah 
App. 1998) ("'Absent [the] record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a 
unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine.' ") 
(citation omitted). The absence of such evidence seriously undermines Defendant's 
attack on the affidavit because it vitiates his claims that the affiant deliberately 
misled the magistrate into mistakenly believing that he was involved in the 
controlled methamphetamine buy. But in any case, as discussed below, Defendant's 
ownership of a different Grand Am is not determinative. 
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where the affidavit did not state that Defendant was involved in the controlled buy 
or was the driver of the car observed vehicle. R42-44. Information concerning the 
controlled buy merely provided background for why the police chose to conduct a 
trash cover. 
In sum, Defendant has not made a "substantial preliminary showing" 
supported by "an offer of proof" that the affiant intentionally or recklessly misled 
the magistrate to connect Defendant with methamphetamine, as evidenced by the 
absence of any statement in the affidavit that the person who drove the vehicle or 
entered the house was Defendant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155, 171. Indeed, the 
prosecutor noted at the motion to dismiss hearing that, other than the name 
"Godfrey" discovered in the trash search, the police had no knowledge of 
Defendant until they searched his residence. R275 (hearing of November 29, 
2007):24-25. Nor has Defendant made the required showing that the absence of any 
mention that the suspect Grand Am was followed without interruption was a 
deliberate effort to omit material information. Id. In fact, Defendant's overall 
suggestion that the alleged misstatements were intended to mislead the magistrate 
into connecting Defendant with methamphetamine is rebutted by the affidavit's 
limited request to search, not for methamphetamine, but only for marijuana, 
marijuana paraphernalia, and evidence of marijuana distribution. R43-44. In short, 
15 
Defendant's claim of misstatement here is simply "speculative and conclusory." Id. 
at 171. 
2. Absence in affidavit of record checks on suspects' license plate. 
Defendant claims that the affidavit's silence concerning whether the police 
ran the Grand Am's license plate and discovered a suspect's name connected to the 
address was "an omission of significance designed intentionally or recklessly . . . to 
cause a magistrate to assess probable cause where none exists." Aplt. Br. at 13. 
This claim is "speculative and conclusory" on its face. In Nielsen, the court 
identified an omission as a misstatement, for Franks purposes "because information is 
omitted." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. But if police, for any reason, do not undertake an 
investigation, and therefore do not develop "information," the absence of such 
information cannot constitute a "misstatement" under Franks. Here, Defendant 
offers no proof that the police conducted the investigation he suggests, or that if 
they did conduct such an investigation they intentionally or recklessly omitted the 
results from the affidavit. As the trial court pointed out with reference to this 
particular claim, "[Ijack of evidence . . . doesn't seem to create a 'misstatement' in 
the warrant." R137. Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, Defendant offered no 
proof that even if the "omission" was material to the determination of probable 
cause that the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted the "information." R137. 
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3. Absence of information surrounding controlled 
methamphetamine buy. 
Defendant claims that "[t]he control buy itself is an omission of significance 
and a misrepresentation to the magistrate as no specific information is provided 
[concerning the controlled methamphetamine buy]." Aplt. Br. at 13-14. This claim 
suffers from the same defect as that discussed immediately above — the assumption 
that the absence of details concerning an investigation, proof of which details is non-
existent, is an "omission" under Franks. Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. Nor, as discussed 
above, has Defendant offered any proof that the affiant intentionally or recklessly 
omitted the "information" concerning the controlled methamphetamine buy. 
4. Alleged misrepresentations concerning the seized garbage 
sacks and their contents. 
Defendant claims that "[a]nother important misrepresentation is that the 
garbage sack seized and confiscated from in front of the property necessarily 
belongs to the suspect that was followed or whether they belonged to any other 
number of individuals who may reside at the residence." Aplt. Br. at 14 (emphasis 
added). Defendant also asserts that "the affiant also misrepresents the essential 
facts surrounding residency documents found in the garbage for a Mr. Godfrey." Id. 
He asserts that "insignificant envelopes" addressed to a "Deloy Godfrey, not a 
17 
Timothy Godfrey, were found in the garbage [which the affiant failed to disclose 
and constituted a misrepresentation to the magistrate]/' Id. 
No facts support this claim. Moreover, the claim misapprehends the purpose 
of the affidavit, a deficiency that makes the suggestion that the identity of persons 
was misrepresented or omitted immaterial. 
The search warrant was not sought for 'Timothy Godfrey" or any named 
individual. It was sought for the single-family residence located at 4521 South Julep 
Drive. R42-43. Defendant has not offered any proof that the detectives were even 
aware of Defendant's existence until they served the warrant and found him in the 
home in possession of controlled substances. R2-3. The name, "Mr. Godfrey," is 
only mentioned in the affidavit to show that the marijuana found in the garbage was 
found inside a garbage bag together with mail addressed to someone residing in the 
home. This fact supports that the marijuana came from inside the residence and 
was discarded by someone living inside the residence, as opposed to a non-resident 
or passerby. The specific identity, however, of the residents of the single-family 
home was irrelevant to establishing probable cause to search the home. Similarly, 
any alleged failure to distinguish a "Deloy Godfrey" from Defendant was 
immaterial in deciding whether to issue a search warrant for specified premises. In 
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this context, none of Defendant's claimed deficiencies in the affidavit constitute 
misrepresentations justifying a Franks hearing. 
5. Adequacy of discovery of single marijuana stem to support 
search for evidence of possession and distribution of 
marijuana. 
Defendant claims the affidavit omits information explaining why discovery of 
a single marijuana stem inside a garbage sack in a trash can outside a single-family 
residence justifies a search of the home for additional marijuana. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. 
Defendant again fails to make any valid claim of intentional or reckless false 
statement intended to mislead the magistrate. The affiant candidly stated the 
amount of marijuana found. R43. He then stated what he expected to find in the 
premises — marijuana, marijuana paraphernalia, and other items related to weighing 
and packaging of marijuana — based on his training and experience. R43-44. Given 
how clearly the affiant set the items the he expected to find, the magistrate could 
readily have struck those items from the warrant as unjustified by probable cause. 
The magistrate did not, and Defendant has failed to identify any misstatement that 
shows that the magistrate was misled in making the probable cause assessment. 
The trial court's last finding clearly and correctly disposes of Defendant's 
Franks claim, based on Defendant's failure to show that any alleged 
misrepresentation was material to the determination of probable cause: 
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[E]ven if [the court] were to strike the material the Defendant 
complains of in the warrant [sic], a Franks hearing would still be 
unnecessary because the warrant still establishes probable cause to 
search the residence at issue/' Id. The redacted warrant [sic] would 
still establish that officers found a marijuana stem in the trash of the 
residence along with some mail addressed to the residence. Even if the 
mail did not establish that the Defendant (a) lived at the residence or 
(b) had possessed the marijuana stem, this evidence does establish 
sufficient probable cause to show that someone in the residence had 
possessed and discarded the marijuana stem and that more marijuana 
and/or paraphernalia would be found in the residence. Therefore, the 
Defendant cannot show that "the affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause after the misstatements are] set aside/7 
R137 (quoting Nielsen, 438 U.S. at 191). 
On appeal, Defendant does not challenge this finding. Moreover, the finding 
is fully supported. See State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah App. 1997) 
(recognizing that that "under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution, a 
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's garbage set out for 
collection on the street, outside the curtilage of a home, and thus no Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from the search of such garbage by law enforcement 
personnel7') (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988)); State v. 
Ranquist, 2005 UT App 482, ^ 10,12,128 P.2d 1201 (concluding that amphetamine 
residue in one of five clear plastic bags found in trash container outside home 
established probable cause to support search warrant). Indeed, Defendant admitted 
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below that "there's case law that says that garbage covers are perfectly okay/' R275 
(transcript of hearing of November 29, 2007):18-19. 
In sum, Defendant has failed to show that the affidavit contains any 
intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions and that even if the affidavit did 
contain such misstatements or omissions that they would be material to the 
determination of the probable cause to search his residence. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SHOWING 
THAT THE REQUESTED DISCOVERY EXISTED, WAS 
POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY, OR WAS MATERIAL TO THE 
DEFENSE 
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion to dismiss 
the information based on his inability to obtain discovery of any reports related to 
the controlled methamphetamine buy referenced in the warrant. Aplt. Br. at 16-20. 
Defendant bases his claim on the discovery requirements of rule 16, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and the principles applicable to the prosecution's destruction of 
evidence, set out in State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^ 39-45,162 P.3d 1106. The 
claim is meritless. 
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A, The information is not subject to dismissal under rule 16 and 
Tiedemann where evidence has not been lost or destroyed, is not 
shown to be reasonably potentially exculpatory, and is immaterial 
to the prosecution or the defense. 
Defendant claims that he was entitled to discovery of any report surrounding 
the controlled methamphetamine buy. Pertinent to that claim, rule 16 requires the 
prosecution to provide "evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(4). The rule also requires 
production of "any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant 
to adequately prepare his defense." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5). 
Additionally, Defendant claims the evidence was lost or destroyed because he 
was unable to obtain discovery of any report surrounding the controlled 
methamphetamine buy. Therefore, he argues,his case should have been dismissed 
under Tiedemann. 
In Tiedemann, the Utah Supreme Court laid out principles to determine 
whether a case should be dismissed when the prosecution has destroyed evidence: 
"In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or 
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destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it necessary to require 
consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the 
evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; 
and (2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and 
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including 
the strength of the remaining evidence/' Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, % 44. 
Additionally, factors relevant to determining the applicability of sanctions in 
cases in which the prosecution had not provided discovery were held relevant to 
cases in which evidence had been destroyed: "(1) the extent to which the 
prosecution's representation [of the existing evidence] is actually inaccurate, (2) the 
tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or 
strategy that could prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of the prosecutor in 
omitting pertinent information or misstating the facts, and (4) the extent to which 
appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or misstated 
evidence." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, | 41. 
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B. The trial court correctly determined that Defendant failed to make 
the required showings to justify dismissal of the prosecution. 
1. Defendant failed to show that the sought-after police report 
concerning the controlled methamphetamine buy existed or 
was exculpatory. 
The trial court correctly rejected Defendant's claim that the case should be 
dismissed because an alleged report concerning the controlled methamphetamine 
buy was lost or destroyed. Having outlined the foregoing analysis from Tiedemann, 
the trial court ruled that "here the Defendant has failed to make a fundamental 
preliminary showing, namely that police reports of the controlled buy ever existed/7 
R139. 'Therefore/' the court continued, "the Defendant cannot show that the 
reports were lost or destroyed or that they would have potentially been 
exculpatory/' Id.. 
The record supports the trial court's finding that no discoverable report 
existed. After his initial motion to suppress was denied, Defendant, represented by 
new counsel, filed a second request for discovery, requesting, among other items, 
police reports and investigations. R56, 58. The State properly responded. R64. 
Defendant also filed a supplemental request for, among other items, a copy of the 
"formal police report" in the case. R70. The court denied the motion. R78-79. 
Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss the case, alleging that the State had failed 
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to produce an alleged police report concerning the controlled buy that purportedly 
would have exposed the "Franks" deficiencies in the affidavit. R100-09. 
At the hearing on his motions for a Franks hearing and to dismiss, Defendant 
admitted that he merely assumed that a police report documenting the controlled 
methamphetamine buy must exist. R275 (hearing of November 29, 2007):2-3. 
Nevertheless, he had since learned that the sought-after police report "doesn't 
exist." Id. at 3.3 
The prosecutor explained the absence of any formal report relating to the 
controlled methamphetamine buy and why she believed rule 16 did not require 
production of such a document in this case. Id. at 4. Nevertheless, she stated that 
she had directed the officers involved in the controlled buy to see if they could 
locate a report. Id. at 5. The prosecutor explained: "They've run through their 
computer system multiple times. It comes up as no report exists" she said. Id. The 
3
 After the trial court denied his motion to dismiss and issued its ruling, 
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. R132-35. Defendant asserted that he 
had spoken to officers after the hearing on his motion to dismiss. R155:3. 
According to Defendant, one of the officers stated that at one time a police report 
did exist but, due to a computer problem, it was no longer available. Id. at 3-4. The 
court denied the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 5; R142. Significantly, the 
officer's alleged comment was not supported by affidavit or any other evidence. 
25 
officers' do, however, maintain a "buy book," which, in this case, did record that a 
controlled buy occurred. Id. But unlike when a suspect is charged and a police 
report generated, the prosecutor explained, "these ["buy book"] reports are very 
different.... These cases typically never result in charges. They're simply to gain 
probable cause to conduct [further police] investigation." Id. Accordingly, because 
on one is charged, information concerning the buys often do not reference actual 
addresses, to protect police, their tactical operations, and confidential informants 
prior to prosecutors filing formal charges, if at all. Id. 5-6, 8-9. Thus, because here 
no one was charged with the controlled buy, there was no "report" to provide. Id. at 
6. The prosecutor offered to have an officer, then present in court, further explain 
the nature of these buy book reports and otherwise testify concerning the affidavit. 
Id. at 5, 6. 
Despite the prosecutor's explanation, Defendant argued that he could not test 
the reliability of the affidavit under Franks without the report, which he believed 
had existed but was lost or destroyed. Id. at 10-11. The trial court ruled that 
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal either because a report was not generated 
and because, even if such a report existed, there was no showing that it might 
contain potentially exculpable material. Id. at 12. The trial court noted that the 
report Defendant sought was essentially "notes taken to justify probable cause for 
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an affidavit/' Id. at 15. Thus, "[E]ven on lost or destroyed information, you have 
another burden to show that it's more than just.. . 'This might have helped me/ If 
that's the best you can say, then you lose on that." Id. at 17. Because Defendant had 
failed to show that any allegedly lost report was exculpatory, the court refused to 
allow Defendant to call the officers present to ask them if they had generated reports 
in connection with the controlled methamphetamine buy. Id. at 28. 
The record shows that no formal report of the controlled methamphetamine 
buy existed. The record also explains the policy reasons for not generating formal 
reports in connection with controlled buys that do not result in formal charges: 
protection of police, their tactical operations, and confidential informants. See State 
v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1973) (holding that 
"constitutional precepts" did not require State to disclose identity of confidential 
informant in challenge to probable cause for search warrant, specifically, to 
challenge the truth of statements in the affidavit by examining the CI on the 
factuality of the activities described in the affidavit). In sum, the trial court correctly 
ruled that there was no need to inquire further because there was no basis to believe 
that an exculpatory report ever existed. 
27 
2. Defendant failed to show that any report concerning the 
controlled methamphetamine buy could have been material to 
his defense of charges for possession of substances and 
paraphernalia unrelated to methamphetamine. 
The trial court ruled "that any police reports, etc., regarding the controlled 
buy are simply not relevant and so dismissal is not appropriate under Tiedemann" 
R139. "Specifically," the court continued, "the defendant was not charged with any 
crime related to the controlled buy, the State has indicated that it does not intend to 
introduce evidence regarding the controlled buy at the trial, and the controlled buy 
information is immaterial to a finding that the warrant here was supported by 
probable cause." Id. Based on the absence of any showing of prejudice, the court 
denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. 
The record supports the trial court's ruling. Defendant was not charged with 
any offense related to possession of methamphetamine, and the prosecutor assured 
the court and Defendant that the State did not intend to introduce evidence 
concerning the controlled methamphetamine buy at trial. Rl-2,128. At no point has 
Defendant shown how disclosure of the hypothetical report concerning an 
uncharged methamphetamine purchase would have assisted in his defense to the 
charged crimes of possession of psilocybin and marijuana and marijuana 
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paraphernalia, especially when he confessed to the latter crimes. R2-3. See State v. 
Hopkins, 989 P.2d 1065,1070 (Utah 1999) (holding that State's purported failure to 
provide identified items in discovery prior to preliminary hearing failed to show 
how the defendant "could have plausibly defeated the State's case for probable 
cause had he been in possession of the evidentiary items he claims the State 
withheld"). Cf. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, (Utah 1986) (rejecting that court's 
refusal to require disclosure of confidential informant violated due process where 
the defendant was unable to show that disclosure, for purpose of showing possible 
entrapment, was "material and essential to [the] defense," and where no showing 
that informant was a material witness in the crime charged or that he could provide 
information relevant to the defense); Bankltead, 514 P.2d 800,802-03 (upholding non-
disclosure of confidential informant on ground that any testimony by confidential 
informant about whom he might have made a purchase was irrelevant to 
prosecution for possession of narcotics for sale). 
In sum, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the 
prosecution where Defendant was unable to show that the allegedly lost or 
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United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the 
prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any 
other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten 
days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be 
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor or 
defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive 
information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent improper use of the information or 
to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, 
including limitations on the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, 
or psychological or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection 
be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of 
discovery be modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a 
party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the 
form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order 
granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the 
appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to 
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under 
the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other 
bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the 
alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, 
reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused 
and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of 
this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be 
grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's 
case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the 




IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That on the premises of 4521 South Julep Drive (480 East) further described as a single family 
dwelling. It is constructed of red brick with wood trim painted red in color. The roof is 
constructed with tan colored asphalt shingles. The residence is located on the east side of Julep 
Drive (480 East) and is the second structure south of 4500 South. The numbers '4521' are 
displayed directly above the front door and are displayed adjacent to the front door to the south, 
against the red brick. Both sets of numbers are silver in color. The front door faces west There 
is a black wrought iron storm door prior to the front door. To include all rooms, attics, 
basements, and other parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, 
and outbuildings of any kind located upon the curtilage of the property. 
In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or 
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia 
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana. 
Articles of personal property tending to establish possession of a controlled substance and 
document sales of a controlled substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and 
other documentation of sales of a controlled substance; articles tending to establish the identity 
of persons in control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility 
receipts, and addressed envelopes, and any other fruits or instrumentality's of the crimes of 
possession or distribution of a controlled substance. 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
jj-> 
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as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct 
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City police officer and has been a police officer for over 10 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Pioneer Division 
Bicycle Patrol. Your affiant has had training in narcotic identification and in the investigation of 
narcotic related offenses. Your affiant's specialized training includes the Utah Police Academy 
(Police Officer Standards and Training) and Rocky Mountain H.I.D.T.A. (High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area). Your affiant has been part of several drug related cases, many of which were 
felonies. Your affiant was a member of the St George Police Department SWAT team. While a 
member of the SWAT team, your affiant conducted numerous surveillances and executed 
numerous narcotic search warrants. 
Information was developed during a controlled purchase of methamphetanune. After the 
controlled purchase, the suspects were followed to 4521 South Julep Drive (480 East). The 
suspects were driving a white Pontiac Grand Am bearing Utah plate 634VJV. The Grand Am 
pulled into the garage of the listed residence and the driver was seen entering the front door of 
the listed residence. 
Narcotics Detectives conducted a trash cover at the listed residence during the early morning 
hours of May 23, 2005. Narcotics Detectives located a garbage can directly in front of the listed 
residence at the street curb. Detectives removed numerous sacks of garbage from the can. The 
garbage sacks were taken to a secure location and searched. Detectives located inside one of the 
garbage sacks, numerous residency documents for a Mr. Godfrey with the address 4521 South 
Julep Drive (480 East) and a marijuana stem. Detectives gave your affiant the recovered items 
from the trash. The stem field tested positive for marijuana. The items were photographed and 
booked into evidence by your affiant. 
Your affiant desires to enter 4521 South Julep Drive (480 East), and search for marijuana, 
marijuana paraphernalia and other items related to the illegal possession of marijuana. The 
paraphernalia includes such items as rolling papers, plastic baggies, pipe, tubes, or "bongs" used 
to smoke marijuana. Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana 
and scales used to weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these 
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items are almost always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances 
have been executed. 
Your affiant desires to search for records, both written and electronic, of marijuana sales, 
residency papers, and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with narcotic 
investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts purchased and 
drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that marijuana is sold for 
money or stolen property. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court 
by Deputy District A t t o m e y ^ f f l ^ %&^HPp fct^^tfsi 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items 
during the day time hours. 
/betective Ivan4?eed Sri^g^1 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^ d a y o ^ T : 2005. 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 061904466 
v. : Judge PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
TIMOTHY CRAIG GODFREY, : Date: December 3, 2 0 07 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on the defendant's Motions to Suppress Evidence Unlawfully 
Seized and to Dismiss. Having considered the memoranda and the arguments raised at the November 29 
hearing, the Court DENIES the defendant's Motions. 
1. Motion to Suppress Evidence Unlawfully Seized 
The defendant argues that he is entitled to a Franks hearing to determine if suppression is appropriate 
here. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing to challenge 
a search warrant" if the defendant can establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit supporting a search warrant 
made a false statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (ii) the affidavit 
is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause after the misstatement is set aside." State v. Nielson, 
727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). This is a fairly heavy burden. A defendant is not allowed a hearing based 
on mere conjecture. Instead, a defendant must first show that the warrant contains material misstates and 
that the affiant made the misstates intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and 
must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations 
of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be 
accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the 
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement 
of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses 
should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or 
innocent mistake are insufficient. 
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Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. While the defendant attempts to meet this burden by listing all the 
"misrepresentations, omissions, and misstatements" in the warrant, this falls short of the required showing 
for a Franks hearing. 
First, many of the alleged "omissions" don't qualify for Franks scrutiny. An omission is only subject 
to the Franks analysis "when a misstatement occurs because information is omitted." See Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
at 191. Here the many of the "omissions" do not create misstatements. Instead, the defendant's arguments 
go to whether the magistrate had probable cause to issue a warrant with the information given. For example, 
the defendant argues that the affidavit omits any discussion of whether the officer(s) did a check on the 
license plate or attempted to connect it to the residence. Lack of evidence on this point doesn't seem to 
create a "misstatement" in the warrant. 
Second, for those misstatements, etc. that could be material, the defendant does not provide "an offer 
of proof of "deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." 
Finally, the Court finds that, even if it were to strike the material the defendant complains of in the 
warrant, a Franks hearing would still be unnecessary because the warrant still establishes probable cause 
to search the residence at issue. The redacted warrant would still establish that officers found a marijuana 
stem in the trash of the residence along with some mail addressed to the residence. Even if the mail did not 
establish that the defendant (a) lived at the residence or (b) had possessed the marijuana stem, this evidence 
does establish sufficient probable cause to show that someone in the residence had possessed and discarded 
the marijuana stem and that more marijuana and/or paraphernalia would be found in the residence. 
Therefore, the defendant cannot show that "the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
after the misstatements are] set aside." 
The defendant also argues that he is entitled to a hearing to determine if the warrant wras properly 
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served. He asserts that it was to be served during the daytime but that it was not. He agrees that the warrant 
was served at approximately 9:40 pm. This was during the "daytime" according to Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 40(a)(1) and so it was properly served. There is no evidentiary issue for the Court to resolve on 
this matter. 
2. Motion to Dismiss 
Next, the defendant argues that the Utah State Constitution requires dismissal here because the 
defendant cannot obtain discovery of any police reports supporting the controlled methamphetamine buy 
referenced in the warrant.1 The Court finds that this argument is also without merit. 
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106 controls the analysis here. Tiedemann holds that 
"In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be 
exculpatory, we find it necessary to require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction 
or loss of the evidence including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the 
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the 
context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence." Id. at ^ [44. Additionally, 
the court in Tiedemann indicated that analysis of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 should govern in cases 
involving destruction of evidence. Under rule 16, if evidence is not disclosed to the defendant, the court 
should balance a number of factors to determine if dismissal is appropriate, including: 
(1) the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing evidence] is 
actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense 
1
 Federal constitutional analysis would be governed here by Youngblood v. Arizona, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). In a cases such as this where the defendant is not aware of the contents of 
any such reports, the defendant would have to show that the police or other government 
actors acted in bad faith in destroying said reports. The Court finds, and the defendant 
apparently concedes, that the defendant cannot prevail under the federal constitution because 
he cannot show bad faith. 
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counsel into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability 
of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating the facts, and (4) the 
extent to which appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted 
or misstated evidence. 
Id. at TJ41 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
The Court finds here that the defendant has failed to make a fundamental preliminary 
showing, namely that police reports of the controlled buy ever existed. Therefore, the defendant 
cannot show that the reports were lost or destroyed or that they would have potentially been 
exculpatory. 
The Court also finds that any police reports, etc. regarding the controlled buy are simply not 
relevant and so dismissal is not appropriate under Tiedemann. Specifically, the defendant was not 
charged with any crime related to the controlled buy, the State has indicated that it does not intend 
to introduce evidence regarding the controlled buy at the trial, and the controlled buy information 
is immaterial to a finding that the warrant here was supported by probable cause. Therefore, the 
Court finds that the defendant will not be prejudiced without this information and so there is no 
reason for dismissal. 
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